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The viability of irrigated systems in Southern Europe is closely linked to efﬁcient institu-
tional settings and water-allocation mechanisms. A signiﬁcant, although not widely used,
mechanism for water allocation is an intra-sectorial water market. The objective of this
paper is to evaluate to what extent water markets may contribute to the improvement
of the efﬁciency of water allocation and to the proﬁtability of irrigated agriculture. The
related issues of water allocation among farm types and farm specialisation are also
addressed. The analysis is based on a basin-level linear programming model, comparing
the situation with and without a market. It includes both ﬁxed and variable transaction
costs and estimates their combined effects on market performances. The model is applied
in two areas in Southern Italy and Spain, and simulates the behaviour of different farm
types, derived from cluster analysis on a sample of farms in each area. The paper conﬁrms
that water markets could potentially improve the economic efﬁciency of water use, in terms
of higher proﬁt per hectare, given limited water availability. The potential improvements
are associated with a more intense specialisation of farms and are strongly differentiated
among farmers, particularly where signiﬁcant restrictions to water availability occur.
This corroborates the expectations of institutional difﬁculties in implementing water
markets. However, the exchanges, and consequently the potential effects of water
markets, are heavily affected by the actual level of water availability, as well as the size and
the structure (ﬁxed vs. proportional) of transaction costs. The paper calls for a more
in-depth analysis of the connections between market performances and institutional




water trading, natural resource management, simulation, 




The viability of irrigated systems in Southern Europe is closely tied to water
policy and institutions, particularly to mechanisms for the allocation of rights
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on the use of water. Water regulation is undergoing considerable changes due
to the increasing perception of the issue of water scarcity. Recent legislation
has sought innovative institutional solutions for reducing water use or increasing
its economic efﬁciency. In particular, the legal framework in the European Union
(EU) is today faced with the application of the Water Framework Directive
(WFD) (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
2000). The WFD sets a framework for comprehensive management of water
resources in the European Community, within a common approach and with
common objectives, principles and basic measures. It addresses inland sur-
face waters, estuarine and coastal waters, and groundwater. The fundamental
objective of the WFD aims at maintaining high status of waters where it
exists, preventing any deterioration in the existing status of waters and
achieving at least good status in relation to all waters by 2015. The WFD
introduces the principle of Full Cost Recovery (FCR) and the Polluter Pays
Principles (PPP). It also proposes economic instruments as recommended
tools for the regulation of water use and pollution (WATECO 2003). Even if
not explicitly mentioned by the directive, water markets can be seen as a kind
of instrument responding to the view that water may be considered as an eco-
nomic good, use of which should be guided (in part) by efﬁciency principles.
The issue of pricing policy and water markets is very much debated in the
water economics literature and particularly in the agricultural water literature





The objective of this paper is to evaluate to what extent water markets may
contribute to the improvement of the economic efﬁciency of water use and to
the proﬁtability of irrigated agriculture. It also addresses the complementary
issue of different participation of farmers in the market (amount of water
bought/sold) and the consequent impact on farm specialisation.
The analysis is based on a linear programming model at basin level. The
model is applied in two areas in Italy and Spain.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the
theoretical background for water markets. Section 3 describes the methodology
adopted. Section 4 illustrates the characteristics of the study areas and the
data sources. Section 5 summarises the main results for the two study areas,
and is followed by a brief discussion in Section 6.
 
2. Theoretical and policy background for water markets
 
Water markets refer to a mechanism of water allocation based on the exchange
of rights on water use. Water markets are proposed and supported by economic
theory on the ground that they lead to the efﬁcient allocation of water resources





However, water markets are not particularly common as water allocation
mechanisms, particularly in agriculture. The acceptability of water markets
and their ability to express their potential contribution to efﬁciency in water
allocation may depend on different issues. 
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Existing experiences around the world (USA, South Africa and Australia)
show that water markets are more acceptable in a mature legal system, with
well-deﬁned property rights on water use, and in communities with a high
degree of trust. This is made necessary by the fact that the sale of water
rights may be associated with a fear of losing those rights. In addition, water
exchanges need to be supported by trustworthy contract enforcement systems.
A clear result is that the existence of water markets is conditional upon adequate
institutions and their introduction may only be accepted if accompanied by
adequate measures, in order to guarantee, for example, adequate compensa-
tion to losers or the conservation of property rights on water (Easter and
Smith 2002). The details about (initial) distribution of property rights and
the bargaining mechanism adopted may also strongly affect the outcome of
water markets (see, for example, DiSegni Eshel 2002).
Willingness to participate in a market may vary according to the length
of the right being exchanged. For example, one-time, seasonal or annual
exchanges may be viewed as a temporary transfer without major implica-
tions. Longer-term contracts may be perceived as encouraging a permanent
transfer of rights or as creating a lock-in situation.
The use of market mechanisms may also be limited by higher transaction
costs compared to those produced by other mechanisms of water allocation.





 (for the collection of information, negotiation, contract




 (for contract enforcement, etc.) (Williamson 1985).
McCann and Easter (2004) examine the issue of transaction costs in con-
nection to different mechanisms of water allocation. The authors point out
how relevant transaction costs should include both those related to water
exchange once the market is established, and those required to set the market
itself. Figures reported by McCann and Easter (2004) show that transaction
costs in water markets account for between 6 and 23 per cent of the transaction
price. A recent literature review about transaction costs in agricultural
policy shows that such costs account for between 0.25 per cent and 110 per cent
of policy transfers, with an average of between 15 per cent and 20 per cent
(Cahill and Moreddu 2005). However, in most cases, the present system
of water distribution already causes high transaction costs (e.g., irrigation
boards’ costs for water management, deﬁnition, and enforcement of property
rights). It is not often clear to what extent water markets would actually increase
such costs. At the moment, data available are very limited and transaction
costs would, in any case, change very much from case to case and over time.
One major issue may be the cost of water transport, necessary for a market
to exist, where possible traders are not already connected by water infrastruc-
tures (canals, pipes). However, in the case of local water markets with all
users connected to the same supply system, this problem does not exist.
An important expected outcome of water markets in agriculture is to pro-
duce a concentration of water use on the more efﬁcient farms. This is likely
to produce a stronger specialisation in high added-value crops by water 
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buyers, whereas the others would retain less-intensive crops. This effect has
been observed in Australia, Chile, and the USA. Although this may contribute
to an increase in the total agricultural production and the number of agricul-




 1998), it also implies an increase in heterogeneity of
opportunities across farms, which could raise equity concerns. Chan (1989)
highlights this problem and emphasises that it could become more signiﬁcant
as the variety (difference in productivity of water) of participants in the
market increases.
Additional problems may arise from the existence of negative externalities




 (1986) identify the changes in the amount
and quality of return water volumes as market deﬁciencies, although they
also propose solutions to mitigate these effects.
The potentialities of water markets are of some interest for European
irrigated agriculture. European agriculture is undergoing major changes with
abandonment by some farmers and an attempt by others to recover com-
petitiveness in the global market. The contribution of water institutions to the
efﬁciency of agricultural production processes is a signiﬁcant issue for today’s
farming sector in Mediterranean areas. Water markets may in principle
help respond to this need. However, they are almost absent in the EU. Only
recently have Spanish regulations allowed for the exchange of water rights,
although some traditional markets have been ages ago in Southern Spain
(Maass and Anderson 1978). In Italy, the legal basis for proper water mar-
kets does not exist. However, there is evidence of formal or informal water
markets in Southern Italy and, to a lesser extent, in the North, although their
size is almost impossible to assess. Given the present situation, an important
step is to check if potential gains from water trading justify a stronger polit-
ical commitment towards the introduction of water markets.
 
3. Methodology and model
 
The rationale behind the methodology adopted in this paper is to represent
water markets through the simulation of optimal water allocation among
competing farm types assuming private proﬁt maximisation. Figure 1 repre-









demand curves respectively of farm type A and farm type B, competing for
the allocation of a ﬁxed amount of water.
The optimal solution is one maximising the aggregated proﬁt function.
This condition would be reached when the marginal productivity of water is
the same in all farms and the resulting allocation would correspond to the
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A key factor in determining the proﬁtability of water markets is both the
amount and the structure of market costs (transaction plus transport costs). 
Impact of markets for irrigation water 365
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006
 
In principle, they may be ﬁxed or proportional to water exchange. They may
be incurred differentially by buyers and sellers, and be dependent on the farm
size and location.
This paper adopts an approach based on the combined modelling of ﬁxed
and proportional transaction costs. The impact of transaction costs (TC) may

























 TC if the transaction
costs affect the buyer. The inclusion of transaction costs changes the optimal
water allocation to the points, respectively c, b, or a’ if transaction costs affect












, respectively. It is clear from Figure 1 that the distribution of
transaction costs affects the price in different ways. If the transaction costs
pertain to the buyer the price tends to be lower than if transaction costs affect
the seller, given the same optimal amount of water traded. The assumption
of proportional transaction costs only is the choice more commonly found in
the literature (e.g., Gómez-Limón and Riesgo 2004). The main implication of
this choice is that the proﬁtability of trading depends only on the marginal
value of water on the farm. Conversely, the main effects of ﬁxed transaction
costs would be to exclude exchanges of water, which total gain is too small to
justify the cost of the transaction. However, ﬁxed transaction costs would not
affect the optimal level of water trading, once it is proﬁtable to enter the
market. In Figure 1, without proportional transaction cost, if ﬁxed transaction
Figure 1 The theoretical framework for water markets with transaction costs. 
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, the transaction does not occur. As a result,
by assuming only proportional transaction costs, the model tends to overes-
timate the willingness to trade water.
Proportional and ﬁxed transaction costs interact. For example, if both sell-
ers and buyers incur proportional transaction costs, the remaining gain from




 in Figure 1, which reduces the maximum
ﬁxed costs acceptable for entry into the market.
Operationally, the methodology adopted in this paper is based on the use of
a mixed-integer linear programming model at basin level and may be seen
as the transposition at basin level of farm-level linear programming models
widely used for the analysis of irrigation issues (see, for example, Berbel and









and Gutierrez 2005). Similar models have already been used in seminal









 (2002) and Berbel and Gutierrez
(2005) try to reﬁne the interpretation of farmers’ objectives through a multicriteria
objective function.
The model adopted in this paper, modiﬁed from Tisdell (2001), is based on
the maximisation of the aggregated gross margin function of the different
farm types identiﬁed in a given area. The market is represented by allowing
the exchange of water across farm types. The model utilises a mono-objective
function for farmers. The assumption of proﬁt maximisation is maintained in
order to simplify the analysis and to allow a straightforward interpretation of
marginal values of water constraints in monetary terms. It also means that
the choice to enter the market is interpreted as a purely economical, proﬁt-
seeking decision, without considering other variables affecting utility, such
as risk considerations. Wherever relevant, limits to proﬁt-maximising behav-
iour due to farmer (or household) attitudes have been added as constraints in
the model. The main extension in this study relative to existing model is
explicitly taking into account transaction costs.
The model has the following structure:
(1)
s.t.
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s = ﬁxed transaction cost of purchasing (respectively selling) water;
pj
p, pj
s = binary variable representing the participation in the market as
buyer (respectively seller) of water.
The farming area is divided according to different farm types. Each farm
type has a relevance on the average results based on the proportion of farm-
ing area occupied by that farm type (weight).
Where water trading is allowed, the water exchanges may be represented
implicitly through the water allocation or explicitly through water purchase
and selling variables. We adopted the second approach. As a consequence,
water allocation to each farm is given by the initial availability, plus the water
purchased, minus the water sold. This then needs to be linked to an additional
complementary constraint stating that total water purchased must be equal
to total water sold.
The gross margin and the amount of water used are derived variables and
key indicators of the system’s performance. The gross margin accounts for
gross revenues minus all variable costs, including costs related to the acquisi-
tion of water. If the water market exists, the gross margin must include the
revenues or payments due, respectively, to water selling or purchasing.
The decision variables in the model consist of the area dedicated to each
activity (xij), the decision to enter the market as a buyer or seller (pj
p, pj
s), and
the amount of water traded wj
p, wj
s. The proportion of surface area of key
crops may be used as a simple indicator of farm specialisation. In all cases,
results may be calculated by farm type in order to assess the differential
impacts on different groups of farmers. The farm area of each farm type is
normalised to 1, so that the land used for each crop is expressed as a fraction
of 1. This is consistent with the decision to use the share of each type’s farm
area in proportion to the total area as a weighting factor for calculating the
average per-hectare results of the model.
Some of the model’s main assumptions need to be clariﬁed. First of all, the
programming model is disaggregated by farm type, each representing the
average behaviour of a group of homogeneous farms. All the farmers who368 J. Pujol et al.
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006
have water use rights can trade. Exchange is possible between all the farm
types within each region.
The initial ‘water availability’ is determined by the pre-determined right of
each farm to get acess to some share of water available at the reservoir or in
the water bodies. As a consequence, it is determined by the combination of
past weather conditions (that affect total water physically available) and
property rights on water before the market exchange takes place.
The contract involves a commitment from a farmer not to use a part of his
or her water rights (seller), and thus the possibility for the counterpart (buyer)
to use the same amount of water in addition to the buyer’s own rights. A system
of water distribution reaching all farmers is supposed already to exist, so water
distribution does not have any implication in terms of transport costs.
Water rights traded are temporary only and are assumed to last 1 year. The
sequence of actions is the following: at the beginning of the year the farmer
ﬁnds out his or her water availability (the forecast of the water authorities),
then decides about water rights exchange, and makes all farming deci-
sions after ﬁnding out about water availability. All farmers act in a context of
perfect information about the technical possibilities (cost, production) given
by the total water available after exchange, but are not fully informed free of
charge about other farmers’ actions and willingness to pay/accept. This gives
rise to the possibility of transaction costs, both ex ante and ex post.
Farms cannot change the type they belong to. There are structural con-
straints that limit this change, for example in the case of livestock or fruit.
Market constraints and CAP constraints may also limit changes in type.
However, the technical economic orientation of farms may in fact change if
major crop mix changes occur. The model is a comparative static one, in
which intertemporal and dynamic issues are not considered.
The data refer to means in each zone for each crop. No weather uncertainty
has been considered. The model takes weather behaviour into account only
in so far as it affects water reserves. If the level of reserves is low, there will be
water restrictions in the area, which are simulated by the model through con-
straints to water availability.
4. Study areas and data collection
The model was constructed for two study areas. The main features of the two
case studies are illustrated in Table 1.
The ﬁrst one is the Low Ter in Catalonia (in the northeast of Spain). In
this area, there are two water users associations (named in Spanish Commu-
nities of Irrigators): Presa de Colomers and Sèquia del Molí de Pals. A Com-
munity of Irrigators is a group comprising all the owners of a single irrigable
zone, who are united by law for the independent and common administration
of irrigation water. These two water users associations have very similar char-
acteristics, and in the study they are considered as one unit. The area is char-
acterised by the cultivation of corn, fruit trees (crops with high costs andImpact of markets for irrigation water 369
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high income), alfalfa, and other minor crops. In addition, in the zone there
are beef cattle operations with feed crops. Water availability is dependent upon
the precipitation and storage capacity of the Susqueda and Sau dams, in the
Higher Ter. Shortages of water have been a regular issue in recent years. With
the objective of avoiding conﬂicts, the criteria of equally (in proportion to
farmland) distributing water across farms has been used up to now, but with
some privileges for the producers of fruit trees. Water regulation is based on
payment by irrigated area.
The second case study is located in the South of Italy (Puglia), in the
Reclamation and Irrigation Board (RIB) area of Capitanata (Province of
Foggia)
1. The RIBs (Consorzi di Boniﬁca e Irrigazione) are public bodies
managed as associations of landowners, which control land reclamation and
the distribution of water over a certain area. Agriculture in the study area is
based on the combination of high-income industrial tomato crops and highly
subsidised local traditional crops such as rain-fed durum wheat. The devel-
opment of high value-added crops, such as tomatoes and other vegetables is
counterbalanced by a high impact on the environment (mainly due to the use
of pesticides and nitrogen fertilisers) and is dependent upon sufﬁcient water
availability. Water regulation is based on volumetric pricing. However, the
aim of the board is not that of reducing water use. Instead, it focuses mainly
on the best allocation of available water. Water availability depends on the
storage capacity of the neighbouring area of Basilicata, from where most of
the water comes. Shortages of water are a frequent problem in the area, even
1 The models used in the case of Foggia were based on data collection and validation carried
out during the project WADI ‘Sustainability of European Irrigated Agriculture under Water
Framework Directive and Agenda 2000’ (EVK1-2000-00057) (Berbel and Gutierrez, 2005).
Table 1 Main features of the two areas
Low Ter Foggia




Water distribution system Canals, pipes, and drains
(not pressure)
Pressure pipes
Irrigation system Surface irrigation Drip irrigation




Prevailing tariff system Area payment based on 
irrigated area
Volumetric
Total agricultural area (ha) 7100 143000
Area in the sample (ha) 1373.4 1258.6
Number of farms sampled 60 131
Average farm size in the 
sample (ha)
22.89 9.6
Methodology for the 
identiﬁcation of farm types
Cluster analysis Cluster analysis
Number of typologies modelled 4 3370 J. Pujol et al.
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affecting human consumption. Water is normally distributed in proportion
to farmland, with the objective of avoiding conﬂicts and guaranteeing equal
opportunities across farms.
In both areas, water markets are absent. In Low Ter this is due to the fact
that, even though the Spanish law allows them, their legal framework is not
entirely developed. In Italy, water markets are absent due to the lack of a
suitable legal framework and to the fact that water exchanges are possibly
viewed as a way of eluding the current increasing block tariff system. The
possibility that water may concentrate into the hands of few farmers is
also viewed as conﬂicting with the basic rationale of the irrigation board
based on the equity-driven idea of irrigation as a support to the development
of small farms.
Altogether, the limited consideration of water markets in the two areas
may be seen as a mix of late adjustment of the local legal system and institu-
tional inertia in adapting to new needs. In fact, the directive 60/2000 does not
explicitly promote water markets, but proposes more generically economic
instruments, usually identiﬁed with volumetric pricing. However, even the
approach based on volumetric pricing (or proxes such as irrigated area
pricing) is not considered as acceptable by most Italian agriculture. However,
the opportunities associated with improved water allocation systems are
becoming a major issue in view of the economic difﬁculties in the farming
sector and the need to increase the efﬁciency of water allocation for produc-
tive purposes.
Farm typologies in each study area were selected by means of a Cluster
Analysis on a dataset derived from a representative sample of farms. In the
Low Ter, the sample of 60 farms was obtained by quota sampling. In each
zone, all the existing farms are classiﬁed by their size in different classes. The
number of farms of each class is the variable used to deﬁne the quota used in
the sampling. In Foggia, the Cluster Analysis was applied to secondary data
derived from an available dataset (land registers held by irrigation boards)
that includes all the farms located in the sub-area considered (131 farms). 
Both the samples were clusterised by a hierarchical algorithm. The Ward
method (Ward 1963) was applied to standardised variables (surface, crop
area, irrigation distribution, etc.) and the number of clusters was derived by
the study of the dendrogram. To validate the analysis, we used an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to test the signiﬁcance of each discriminant variable
(crop mix and farm size).
Four clusters were identiﬁed for Low Ter and three for Foggia. A descrip-
tion of farm types and related modelling features is provided in Table 2.
The four clusters in the Low Ter were characterised as being specialised in
fruit growing, livestock production, or corn. An additional cluster is based
on mixed crops. In the area of Foggia, three clusters were identiﬁed, on the
basis of a combination of farm dimensions and crop specialisation. Large
farms are basically characterised by cereal–tomato cultivation, whereas small








































































































































Table 2 Types of productive orientation of the farms identiﬁed by means of the cluster analysis and main features of the models
Low Ter Foggia
Model LT.1 LT.2 LT.3 LT.4 Fg.1 Fg.2 Fg.3 
Description Extensive –
mixed crops








Average farm size (ha) 18.31 20.51 29.62 33.91 7.52 7.71 31.36 
Constraints:
– Land X X X X X X X
– Water X X X X X X X
– Labour XXX
– CAP (set-aside) X X X X
– Market X
– Rotations X X X X X X X
– Speciﬁc type of soil X X
– Cattle feeding X
Cluster weight (λj) 0.34 0.19 0.12 0.35 0.365 0.361 0.274
Validation: sum of percent 
deviations from real crop mix
19.91 10.49 3.54 5.11 13.39 19.29 4.45
Note: X indicates that a constraint is used in a speciﬁc model.372 J. Pujol et al.
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production. Even though many farms in the Fg. 1 cluster reveal that many
farmers employ multiple land uses, no separate cluster was deﬁned based on
mixed farming. In analogy, non-farm activities have not been considered in
deﬁning the clusters, so that hobby farming or pluriactive farming are not
detected by the clusters.
Models were calibrated using primary data collected from the surveyed
farms, concerning technical coefﬁcients, economic parameters, resource
availability, and constraints. Constraints include standard constraints such as
land, labour, commercial constraints, and rotations. Land and labour con-
straints are given by resource availability, whereas commercial constraints
and rotation mainly affect minimal/maximal proportion among crops. Land,
water, and rotation constraints are included for all farm types. Labour con-
straints are the main determinant of the crop mix in the Foggia area. Market,
soil, and cattle feeding constraints are binding in the Low Ter models. Market
constraints are the main limiting factor for fruit expansion. In spite of their
potential usefulness, market constraints are not used in the Italian vegetable
and tomato farms, as in this case either water, rotation, or labour availability
is the real limiting factor, depending on the farm. Labour constraints have
been constructed by period. Five periods were speciﬁed. Models were validated
against the actual crop mix, using as a simple validation parameter the sum
of per cent deviations between the actual and the estimated crop mix. This
validation parameter was selected on the rationale that the crop mix is the
main indicator of actual choices taken by the farm. The validation parameter
is mostly below 10 per cent, which was judged to be good performance, with
only two cases (LT.1 and Fg.2) approaching 20 per cent.
An estimation of true transaction costs arising from water markets was not
possible due to the absence of such a form of water allocation mechanism in
the two areas. From a preliminary discussion carried out with local repre-
sentatives and technical analysis of the water distribution system, however, it
emerged that exchanges of water rights in the areas may be devised without
additional water losses (leakages) or requirements for water transport infra-
structure. As a consequence, transaction costs are most likely to be identiﬁed
in search, negotiation, implementation, and enforcement costs. Given existing
water-metering systems, it is likely that most transaction costs could be due
to general negotiation about water prices. Such costs would be fairly low
thanks to the role of the RIB in Foggia and of the water users associations in
Low Ter. Given this situation, transaction costs would most probably be
around the lower ﬁgures discussed in Section 2. However, in the absence of
clear data, results are presented by performing a sensitivity analysis on trans-
action cost, distinguishing ﬁxed and variable transaction costs. The levels of
transaction costs used are the same for the two areas, even if this is not nec-
essarily the case in practice. Variable transaction costs were allowed to vary
in a range of the same magnitude of water prices in the two areas. The
selected levels of transaction cost for sensitivity analysis were 0.00, 0.05 and
0.10 euro/m
3. Note that the transaction costs are deﬁned as sum per cubicImpact of markets for irrigation water 373
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metre, and not as a percentage of prices. Fixed transaction costs are allowed
to vary within a range that considers the probable value of a few working
days for the farmer, plus some travel and administrative costs (0, 500, and
1000 euro/farm).
5. Results and discussion
Gains from introducing water markets for different levels of transaction costs
and water availability in the two areas are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
The maximum increase in gross margin with zero transaction costs is
about 156 euro/ha in Low Ter and 95 euro/ha in Foggia. This result does not
say anything about the distribution of this gross margin. However, given the
economic orientation of the farms and the changes caused by the modiﬁed
availability of water, the increase in gross margin would mainly consist of
increased remuneration for family labour. In the case of Low Ter, the increase
of beneﬁts generated by the water market may be as high as 30 per cent,
whereas the highest increase in Foggia is less than 10 per cent. Altogether,
although the effect of the market appears rather signiﬁcant in Low Ter, it
seems less important in Foggia.
In both cases, the highest level of variable transaction costs result in zero
gain from the introduction of a water market (except in the case of zero ﬁxed
transaction costs for Foggia). For Low Ter, the gains are broadly similar for
the three levels of water availability, whereas for Foggia, there are distinct
differences between the levels, with the highest availability resulting in no
gain from market introduction unless total transaction costs are zero. This
is because the demand curves (marginal value of water) and the distance
between demand curves of different clusters fall much more sharply for Foggia
than for Low Ter. In other words, 1000 m
3/ha is a relatively smaller amount
of water in Low Ter than in Foggia.
Assuming that the most likely results will be those related to the lower
levels of proportional transaction costs and moderate ﬁxed transaction costs,
the introduction of a water market would generate modest beneﬁts in Low
Ter (4.5–6.1 per cent increase in GM) and at most, modest beneﬁts in Foggia
(0.0–3.4 per cent increase in GM).
In other results not shown in Table 3, we calculated that, given zero pro-
portional transaction costs, the water market would generate no gains for
ﬁxed transaction costs greater than around 1500–2000 euro/farm in Foggia
and around 4500–5000 euro/farm in Low Ter.
The water availability corresponding to the highest increases in gross mar-
gin is around respectively 2000 m
3/ha for Low Ter and 1000 m
3/ha for Foggia,
which is about half of the water availability for each area in a normal year.
This result is determined by the difference in the marginal value of water among
clusters of the same area (and not by the marginal value of water in itself).
The difference in marginal value of water tends to be low for small amounts


















































































































Table 3 Gain from markets for different levels of transaction costs – Low Ter (Spain)
Table 4 Gain from markets for different levels of transaction costs – Foggia (Italy)















0 0.0 120.0 (30.0%) 156.9 (31.8%) 130.1 (22.2%) 0.042 0.022 0.018
0.05 39.1 (9.8%) 58.7 (11.9%) 48.8 (8.3%) 0.032 0.021 0.020
0.1 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) – – –
500 0.0 98.2 (24.7%) 136.6 (27.6%) 113.5 (19.4%) 0.042 0.012 0.014
0.05 17.9 (4.5%) 39.7 (8.0%) 35.6 (6.1%) 0.032 0.021 0.023
0.1 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) – – –
1000 0.0 77.8 (19.4%) 117.5 (23.8%) 103.7 (17.7%) 0.042 0.012 0.011
0.05 0.0 (0%) 20.6 (4.2%) 25.8 (4.4%) – 0.023 0.023
0.1 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) – – –
Note: – indicates that there is no water price, as there are no water exchanges.















0 0.0 95.0 (8.3%) 69.4 (5.3%) 11.3 (0.83%) 0.208 0.032 0.032
0.05 68.2 (5.9%) 35.5 (2.7%) 0.0 (0%) 0.190 0.051 –
0.1 49.3 (4.3%) 1.7 (0.1%) 0.0 (0%) 0.172 0.169 –
500 0.0 58.9 (5.1%) 41.6 (3.2%) 0.0 (0%) 0.208 0.032 –
0.05 38.6 (3.4%) 7.8 (0.6%) 0.0 (0%) 0.190 0.051 –
0.1 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) – – –
1000 0.0 31.1 (2.7%) 13.8 (1.0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.208 0.032 –
0.05 10.8 (0.9%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.190 – –
0.1 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) – – –
Note: – indicates that there is no water price, as there are no water exchanges.Impact of markets for irrigation water 375
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Ter and 1000 m
3/ha Foggia correspond to the levels of water availability
where the difference in the marginal value of water (demand curve) among
farm types is larger, and hence, the gains from trade are higher.
In both cases, the amounts of water availability corresponding to the
higher gains from trade are actually very close to the real quantity of water
distributed in drought years. However, such amounts could become the
norm due to climate change and pressures from other sectors (domestic,
recreation), even if exchanges with such sectors are not allowed. This raises
the possibility that markets could contribute more to improved water man-
agement in the area than indicated in the results of this study.
Tables 5 and 6 show water exchanges among clusters and how they are
affected by transaction costs, assuming the level of water availability that
Table 5 Water exchanges among clusters − Water availability = 2000 m
3/ha − Low Ter (Spain)
(positive value = buying; negative value = selling)


















0 0.0 2000 –5099.8 –375.9 954.5 1014.0
0.05 2000 –5099.8 0 825.6 968.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0
500 0.0 2000 –5121.6 0 837.5 973.1
0.05 2000 –5099.8 0 825.6 968.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0
1000 0.0 2000 –5121.6 0 837.5 973.1
0.05 2000 –5099.8 0 825.6 968.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6 Water exchanges among clusters – Water availability = 1000 m
3/ha − Foggia (Italy)
(positive value = buying; negative value = selling)















Fg.31 – Large 
cereals–tomatoes
0 0.0 179.1 –741.3 738.1 267.6
0.05 179.1 –741.3 738.1 267.6
0.1 17.8 –490.3 622.3 177.0
500 0.0 0 –560.2 738.1 202.2
0.05 0 –560.2 738.1 202.2
0.1 0 –472.3 622.3 170.5
1000 0.0 0 –560.2 738.1 202.2
0.05 0 –560.2 738.1 202.2
0.1 0 0 0 0376 J. Pujol et al.
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denotes the strongest market impacts (respectively 2000 m
3/ha for Low Ter
and 1000 m
3/ha for Foggia).
In both cases, water is mostly bought by one farm type only, namely fruit
farms for Low Ter and vegetable farms for Foggia. Livestock farms in Low
Ter purchase small volumes of water, but only in the case of zero transaction
costs. As expected, proportional transaction costs have an impact mainly on
the amount of water sold, whereas ﬁxed transaction costs mainly affect
entry and exit from the market. In relation to the amount available, water
exchanges are much more signiﬁcant in Low Ter (about 50 per cent of water
availability) than in Foggia (about 25 per cent of water availability). This is
due to the stronger heterogeneity of farms in the Low Ter.
A key determinant of water exchange is actual water availability. Figure 2
shows the total water exchange among clusters as a function of the water
availability in Low Ter, assuming no transaction costs. The ﬁgure highlights
the markedly different positions of different kinds of farms with respect to
water markets. In Low Ter, clusters 1 and 4 are the main sellers, whereas clus-
ter 3 and, to a lesser extent, cluster 2 are the buyers. In the same way, in the
case of Foggia, cluster 2 is the main buyer, denoting a strong concentration
of water resources towards intensive vegetable growers (Figure 3). However,
the positions of particular clusters as buyers and sellers may reverse depend-
ing on water availability.
Water exchanges are closely connected to changes in crop mix patterns. A
synthesis of the relevant changes may be represented through the percent
changes in the area devoted to fruit in Low Ter and vegetables in Foggia, in
the market versus non-market situation. Changes are given by farm type in
Figure 2 Water exchanges among clusters as a function of water availability (transaction
costs = 0) (Low Ter, Spain).Impact of markets for irrigation water 377
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order to emphasise the different impact on the degree of farm specialisation
(Figures 4 and 5).
In both areas, the increase in key crops is highly concentrated on a single
farm type. In Foggia, below 1000 m
3/ha, the increase in vegetable growing in
cluster 3 is compensated by a reduction in vegetable growing in the other
clusters. In Low Ter, a net increase in fruit growing in cluster 2 is not com-
pensated by any changes in the other clusters. The main peak of the curve,
Figure 3 Water exchanges among clusters as a function of water availability (transaction
costs = 0) (Foggia, Italy).
Figure 4 Percentage variation (market vs. non-market) of key crops (fruit) by cluster (Low
Ter, Spain).378 J. Pujol et al.
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after which the percent of fruit/vegetables decreases, meaning that the area
devoted to these crops has reached the maximum achieveable, that is, the size
that would be chosen by the farm if there were no water restrictions. This
means that, in Low Ter, if water exchange is allowed, even with a water avail-
ability of about 1200 m
3/ha it is possible to grow the same amount of fruit
that would be grown if there was plenty of water. The same happens for
vegetables in Foggia at about 1500 m
3/ha.
Several aspects of these results call for attention to the instituional frame-
work, which goes beyond simply whether or not to allow water exchanges
between private individuals. First, the institutional setting may have a key
role in guaranteeing low transaction costs, through a proper regulation of
water transactions. Also, there is  a strong role of public or collective bodies
in maintaining public trust vis à vis a water-allocation mechanism (water
market) that may have a rather differentiated impact on different farm types.
These results are consistent with those obtained by Garrido (2000) and
Gómez-Limón and Martínez (2005) who studied the feasibility of water
markets in other areas of Spain (Guadalquivir zone and Duero Valley), with
very different features. The institutional framework was also emphasised by
Calatrava and Garrido (2005), who proved the importance of providing a
reliable market setting for the efﬁciency of a water market.
6. Concluding comments
This paper conﬁrms that water markets could potentially improve the eco-
nomic efﬁciency of water use in the study areas and highlights that the
level of beneﬁts depend crucially on the level of transaction costs. Given
Figure 5 Percentage variation (market vs. non-market) of key crops (vegetables) by cluster
(Foggia, Italy).Impact of markets for irrigation water 379
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transaction costs at realistic levels, the level of economic gains from introduc-
tion of a market are likely to be modest, at best. If this is added to the likely
amount of ‘unreportable’ transaction costs and to the lack of an adequate
legal framework for the years to come, the development of water markets is
not to be expected in the near future in the areas under analysis.
The paper also emphasises how different structures (ﬁxed vs. proportional)
of transaction costs may lead to different outcomes. However, the considera-
tion of this issue would beneﬁt from further research on the nature of the
transaction costs and their effects on decision making. For example, subjec-
tively low shadow prices of farmers’ labour may keep transaction costs low,
whereas risk perception and uncertainty about the future allocation of water
rights would push transaction costs above reported ones.
We can also expect the improvement in water allocation to be reﬂected in
higher specialisation and higher incomes. Hence, the market can contribute
to maintain high value-added crops even with relatively low water availability.
These achievements, however, may involve a trade-off with equity considera-
tions and homogeneous development of farms.
From the agricultural point of view, this leads to the problem of the choice
of agricultural policy objectives (develop a more competitive agriculture vs.
maintaining a social-oriented rural development strategy), taking into account
how they will be affected by resource policy.
From the water policy point of view, these results highlight the importance of
taking into account the complexity of agricultural systems and agricultural policy
objectives in designing policies for water conservation matching local objectives. 
From both points of view, however, present water policies for irrigated
agriculture, mostly based on a subsidisation of agriculture and aimed at giving
some opportunities to as many farmers as possible, appear inadequate.
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